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Abstract
Software which is embedded in aircraft to which people entrust their lives becomes safety-
critical and consequently must be of the highest quality. Failures of such software must be
virtually non-existent. Due to the high costs of aircraft, hypothetical software failures would
also incur major financial losses. To guarantee that the safety of aircraft is an uncompromisable
requirement, an independent government agency certifies aircraft as fit-for-use.
The experience with a software development process model accommodating both safety-critical
requirements as well as commercial requirements is described. The findings are based on
process and product metrics. The first two versions of the software product have successfully
passed the certification and are currently being flown in numerous aircraft. In fact the software
product is so successful that it will be adapted to other aircraft models.
Measuring the requirements evolution contributed to the change from a waterfall based software
development process to a spiral software development process. Design stability is reflected in
the module evolution but needs to be complemented by other information. Requirements
evolution and its implementation status combined with design stability help in the trade-off
between additional deliveries, their functions and their release dates.
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Abbreviations
CASE Computer Aided Software Engineering
COTS Commercial-Of-The-Shelf
EFIS Electronic Flight Instrument System
FAR Federal Airworthiness Requirement
HMI Human Machine Interface
IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions
JAR Joint Aviation Requirement
NTSB (US) National Transport Safety Board
MC/DC modified condition/ decision coverage
SA / RT Structured Analysis / Real Time extensions
SD Structured Design
TCD Test Case Definition
VMC Visual Meteorological Conditions
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1 Introduction
Software which is embedded in aircraft to which people entrust their lifes becomes safety-
critical and consequently must be of the highest standards. Failures of such software must be so
rare as virtually non-existing during the lifetime of all aircraft concerned. Due to the high costs
of aircraft, hypothetical software failures would also incur major financial losses, a further drive
to require the highest quality. It is clear that in aircraft, safety is an uncompromisable
requirement.
To guarantee the safety of aircraft, an independent government agency certifies aircraft as fit-
for-use. Only after this certification the aircraft may be used commercially. To guarantee a
 world-wide equal level of safety, software airworthiness requirements are stated in one
document, [DO-178B].  This document contains information for both the certification
authorities and the developers.
A software development process based on the waterfall model is a well-proven way to produce
safety-critical software. [DEKK, KESS] provides an example where an ESA-PSS05 compliant
process is used. For complex technical systems like aircraft, the commercially determined time-
to-market mandates co-development of the various subsystems. Co-development will
inevitably result in requirements evolution. Even more so if complicated Human Machine
Interfaces are involved. The waterfall model is not intended to cope with such requirements
evolution.
The experience with a DO-178B compliant software development process which accommodates
a commercial time-to-market is described. The findings are based on process and product
metrics. The first two product versions have successfully passed the certification and are
currently being flown in numerous aircraft. In fact the software product is so successful that it
will be adapted to other aircraft models.
The sequel starts with a short description of the application. Subsequently some information
about the air transport safety requirements is provided, together with its influence on the
software development process to be applied. The experience gained during the production of the
embedded application is described, supported by metrics. The findings are summarised in the
conclusions.
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2 Application description
To fly aircraft under all (adverse) conditions, pilots must fully rely on the data presented to
them, and on the correct and timely forwarding of their commands to the relevant aircraft
subsystems. The embedded avionics application discussed combines, controls, processes and
forwards the data between the subsystems and the flight deck. The flight deck may contain
conventional mechanical displays or a modern Electronic Flight Instrument System (EFIS) or
even a mix of these. The application generates all information for the flight deck as well as
processes all pilot inputs. This renders the application vulnerable to changes in the aircraft's
Human Machine Interfaces.
The embedded application is designed to operate in both Visual Meteorological Conditions
(VMC) and Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC). In the former conditions, the pilot
can obtain part of the necessary flight information from visual cues from outside the cockpit.
These conditions limit the aircraft operations to good weather operations. The latter conditions
allow all-weather operations of the aircraft. Under these conditions the displays of the flight
deck are needed by the pilot to fly. This renders the correct functioning of the displays safety-
critical. A number of equipment items needs to be duplicated to achieve the required low failure
probability.
During normal operations the embedded application processes about 100 different flight
parameters, originating from 10 different sensors, some of which are duplicated. Two
processors are used in each of the duplicated hardware units. The delay times within the entire
embedded application should be guaranteed to be less then 30 milliseconds with a cycle time of
25 milliseconds for the main processor. During the operational life of the embedded application
many extensions are expected, so 50% spare processor time shall be allowed for. The I/O
processor has a cycle time of 360 microseconds.
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The influence of safety on the embedded application's functions will be illustrated for data
input. Depending on the criticality of the flight parameter, the software validates it in up to four
complementary ways:
 coherency test: a check on correct length and parity of the data;
 reception test: a check on the timely arrival of the data;
 sensor discrepancy test: a comparison between the two data values produced by the two
independent redundant sensors; and
 module discrepancy test: a comparison between the two parameter values produced by the
same sensor; one value directly read by the system from the sensor, and one obtained from
the redundant system via a cross-talk bus.
[Kess, Slui] contains more information on the application.
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3 Air transport safety requirements
3.1 Applicable software safety document
For safety-critical software in airborne equipment [DO-178B] has been developed. This
document provides guidance for both the software developers and the certification authorities.
In civil aviation an independent governmental institution, the certification authority, performs
the ultimate system acceptance by certifying the entire aircraft. Only then the constituent
software is airworthy and ready for commercial use. [DO-178B] provides a world-wide "level
playing field" for the competing industries as well as a world-wide protection of the air
traveller, which are important due to the international character of the industry. In NLR's case
the certification authority concerned delegated some of its technical activities to a specialised
company.
Certifying the entire aircraft implies that when an aircraft operator wants an aircraft with
substantial modifications, the aircraft including its embedded software has to be re-certified.
 Substantial modifications are, for example, modifications which can not be accommodated by
changing the certified configuration files.
[DO-178B] was the first widely used document to address safety-critical software. Based on
amongst others the experience gained with this document, currently other more general-purpose
standards are available, like [ISO/DIS 15026] and [IEC 61508]. [SAE ARP 4754] addresses the
certification considerations for highly-integrated or complex aircraft systems. [SAE ARP 4754]
is complementary to [DO-178B] and applicable hardware specific standards.
3.2 Safety classification
Based on the impact of the system (i.e. aircraft) failure the software failure can contribute to, the
software is classified into 5 levels. The failure probability in flight hours (i.e. actual operating
hours) according to the Federal Airworthiness Requirement /Joint Aviation Requirement
[FAR/JAR-25] has been added. [FAR/JAR-25] uses the general principle of an inverse
relationship between the probability of a failure condition and the degree of hazard to the
aircraft or its occupants. As [DO-178B] considers qualitative demonstration of software
compliance to such high reliability to be beyond the current software technology, the
[FAR/JAR-25] numbers are provided for information only.
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Level A: Catastrophic failure
Failure conditions which would prevent continued safe flight and landing.
[FAR/JAR-25] extremely improbable, catastrophic failure < 1x10-9
These failure conditions are so unlikely that they are not anticipated to occur during the entire
life of all aircraft of one type.
Level B: Hazardous/Severe-Major failure
Failure conditions which would reduce the capability of the aircraft or the ability of the crew to
cope with adverse operating conditions to the extent that there would be:
 a large reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities;
 physical distress or higher workload such that the flight crew could not   be relied on to
perform their tasks accurately or completely;
 adverse effect on occupants including serious or potentially fatal    injuries to a small
number of those occupants.
[FAR/JAR-25] extremely remote, 1x10-9 < hazardous failure < 1x10-7
Level C: Major failure
Failure conditions which would reduce the capability of the aircraft or  the ability of the crew to
cope with adverse operating conditions to the  extent that there would be, for example:
 a significant reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities;
 a significant increase in crew workload or in conditions impairing crew efficiency, or
 discomfort to occupants, possibly including injuries.
[FAR/JAR-25] remote, 1x10-7 < major failure < 1x10-5
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Level D: Minor failure
Failure conditions which would not significantly reduce aircraft safety and  which would
involve crew actions that are well within their capabilities.  Minor failure conditions may
include for example:
 a slight reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities;
 a slight increase in crew workload, such as, routine flight plan changes or some
inconvenience to occupants.
[FAR/JAR-25] probable, minor failure > 1x10-5
Level E: No Effect
Failure conditions which do not affect the operational capability of the aircraft or  increase crew
workload.
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3.3 Software life cycle
[DO-178B] deliberately refrains from making statements about appropriate software life cycle
models. The life cycle is described rather abstract as a number of processes that are categorised
as follows:
 software planning process which entails the production of the following documents:
 plan for software aspects of certification. The main purpose of this document is to define
the compliance of the chosen software development process to [DO-178B] for the
certification authorities. This document contains many references to the project
documentation generated as part of the applied life cycle model;
 software development plan, which defines the chosen software life cycle and the software
development environment, including all tools used;
 software verification plan, which defines the means by which the verification objectives
will be met;
 software configuration management plan;
 software quality assurance plan.
 software development processes consisting of :
 software requirement process;
 software design process;
 software coding process;
 integration process.
 integral processes which are divided into :
 software verification process;
 software configuration management process;
 software quality assurance process;
 certification liaison process.
The integral processes are a result of the criticality of the software. Consequently the integral
processes are performed concurrently with the  software development processes throughout the
entire software life cycle.
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3.4 Verification
In order to provide the developer with maximum flexibility, [DO-178B] allows the developer to
choose the software life cycle model. [DO-178B]  enforces traceability to its general
requirements by verifying that the life cycle process provides all data it requires. Each
 constituent software development process has to be traceable, verifiable and  consistent.
Transition criteria need to be defined by the developer to  determine whether the next software
development process may be started. In case of iterative processes, like in the spiral model,
attention needs to be paid to the verification of process inputs which become available after the
subsequent process is started.
Verification is defined in [DO-178B] as "the evaluation of the results  of a process to ensure
correctness and consistency with respect to the  inputs and standards to that process". Review,
analysis, test or any combination of these three activities can accomplish verification. Review
provides a qualitative assessment of correctness.
Analysis is a detailed examination of a software component. It is a  repeatable process that can
be supported by tools. Every tool needs to be  verified against the Tool Operational
Requirements, the contents of which is prescribed in [DO-178B]. For software tools the same
documentation and configuration control procedures apply as for the airborne software.  Every
software tool needs approval of the certification authority.
Testing is "the process of exercising a system or system components to verify that it satisfies
specified requirements and to detect errors".  By definition the actual testing of deliverable
software forms only part  of the verification of the coding and integration processes. For
software classified at [DO-178B] level A, a mandatory 100% code coverage  applies. This code
coverage consists of :
 statement coverage (every statement executed, called statement testing in   [BS7925-2]);
 decision coverage (every decision executed for pass and fail, called branch/decision testing
in [BS7925-2]), and
 the modified condition/ decision coverage (mc/dc, same name in [BS7925-2]). Mc/dc
requires that for every condition in a decision, its effect on the outcome of the decision is
demonstrated.
Code coverage will be shown at module level testing.
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4 Software development process
The definition of the software development process has been guided by previous experience
with safety-critical software for spacecraft. More information on the spacecraft application is
provided in [Dekk, Kess].
The project team was set up consisting of 2 separate groups, a development group and a
verification group. The verification group was headed by a team  member with sufficient
authority to report, at his own discretion, to the  company management outside the project
hierarchy, in compliance with [DO-178B]. Furthermore the quality assurance manager was
independent from both teams and not allowed to produce deliverable code or tests.  The quality
assurance manager needed his technical  background in order to judge technical choices made.
The embedded application project started using :
 the DOD-STD-2167A life cycle model [DOD], which is based on the waterfall model ;
 customer supplied requirement specifications in plain English ;
 formal reviews after each life cycle phase;
 software analysis using Structured Analysis with Hatley and Pirbhai Real Time extensions
(SA/RT) [Hatl, Pirb] supported by a Computer Aided Software Engineering (CASE) tool;
 software design using Yourdon Structured Design (SD) supported by the same CASE tool;
 the customer prescribed C language;
 NLR's proprietary C coding standard, with project specific enhancements and enforced by a
static analysis tool;
 execution of module tests and integration tests on the target system;
 an automated test tool to aid the construction and cost effective repetition of the functional
tests and code coverage tests;
 a proprietary configuration management tool;
 module and integration testing on the target with a simulated environment;
 integration with the aircraft avionics suite after integration of the embedded application.
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5 Experience
5.1 DO-178B experience
Modern aircraft contain huge amounts of software, supplied by numerous independent suppliers
world-wide. Even a single aircraft contains software of many different suppliers. According to
the US National Transport Safety Board (NTSB), [DO-178B] works well as up to now  no
catastrophic failure (i.e. fatalities or hull losses) can be directly attributed to a software failure
[IEEE]. An independent software engineering experiment using a [DO-178B] compliant
software development process by NASA confirms that no errors were identified in the
developed  software [Hayh]. [DO-178B] contains sufficient information for first  time users to
implement a compliant software process.
5.2 Software classification
In the embedded application, software classified at levels A, B and E has been realised.
Partitioning software is produced to allow software of various levels to run on the same
processor. At the end of the project 81% of the modules are classified at level A, 8% at level B
and 11% at level E. The increasing number of data fusion requirements lead to a larger share of
level A software at the expense of level B software.  With the small amount of level B modules
remaining it is unclear whether  the advantages of less rigorous testing of level B software
outweigh  the more complicated software development process.
When software classified at different levels has to run on the same processor, special
partitioning software guarantees that software of one level can under no circumstance
compromise the functioning of software at other levels.  This partitioning software consumed
only 1% of the total project effort. Even if all level B software would be developed as level A
software, the partitioning software  remains necessary and cost effective for separation of level
A and level E  (mainly maintenance) software.
5.3 C language
The C programming language contains numerous constructs that are unspecified, undefined or
left to be defined by the compiler supplier [Hatt]. The C programming language is considered a
project risk. This risk  was reduced by choosing an ISO C-90 (also known as ANSI-C)
compliant compiler complemented by a project coding standard defining, amongst others, a safe
subset of C. Compliance to this project coding standard can be verified automatically by
customising a commercial tool. The tool verification required by [DO-178B] revealed that the
version management  by the tool supplier turned out to be inadequate. The tool was  already
marketed world-wide since 1986 to hundreds of customers. This  illustrates the rigour of the
applied verification processes.
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5.4 Requirements evolution
Due to the commercially defined short time-to-market, the customer defined  the system
requirements concurrently with the  software requirement process. Before the start of the
software design  process the resulting analysis was subjected to a number of informal  detailed
technical assessments, performing the formal requirements  verification activities with the
exception of the certification authority involvement.
To aid the integration of the embedded application with the displays, co-developed by the
customer, and subsequently with the avionics suite of the aircraft, a first version of the software
with limited functionality  was delivered before completion of the software requirements and
software design processes. The first version served its purpose well.  A lot of feed-back was
obtained,  resulting in many changes to and clarifications of the system requirements. Figure 1
depicts the resulting requirements evolution from the project start. Every point indicates a
 formal delivery of a working prototype or system to the customer. Figure 1 is cumulative: the
number of partially implemented requirements is added to the  number of fully implemented
requirements. Superimposed is the number  of requirement changes for each delivery. The status
of a requirement in a delivery can be:
 fully implemented;
 partially implemented i.e. the delivery only partially complies with the requirement and
additional work is needed arrive at full compliance;
 not implemented, i.e. no part of the requirements is included in the delivery.
Fig. 1 Evolution of requirements and their implementation status
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The increase in the number of requirements and the reduction in the number of implemented
requirements after 300 and 520 working days are caused by new issues of the requirements
document.
The changes are caused by (in descending order):
 changes in the Human Machine Interfaces (HMI) of the aircraft. These changes originate
from pilot comments and can only be obtained from demonstrating a working prototype in a
realistic environment. Co-development of the displays and the embedded application helps
to reduce the amount of changes on system level;
 adding product features. Apart from marketing input, these changes also result from
experience with an actual prototype;
 integration of the embedded application with the displays and the aircraft subsystems.
Formal methods to specify these interfaces might have helped to reduce this class of
changes;
 ambiguities in the plain English specifications. Especially for  HMI related features an
unambiguous specification method which is  intelligible for pilots, HMI experts and
computer software experts is needed.
The requirements evolution combined with the need for intermediate versions resulted in a
change from the waterfall model to the spiral model. For the  non-certified versions the formal
reviews were replaced by technical  reviews with the same contents but without the external
attendants. The multiple deliveries implied frequent integration with the avionics suite at the
customer's site. This resulted in the combination of our team with the customer's display team
on one site. Of the 15 deliveries only the ones at 655 and 779 calendar days have  been certified.
Note that the non-certified versions are not to be used in flying aircraft.
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5.5 Design evolution
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the number of modules (files containing  C code) and external
functions over time.
Fig. 2 Module evolution
Up until the first certified version the number of modules increased only slightly, indicating that
all changes could be accommodated in the original design. Due to different verification
requirements, software of different levels was split into different modules for certified
versions. This splitting causes the sharp rise in the number of commonly developed modules
just before the first certified version. Evolving data fusion requirements  influenced the safety
classification of some functions.  Some simplifications of a communication protocol for  the
second certified version resulted in a minor reduction in  the number of modules.
The number of external functions rose approximately  continuously until the first certified
version, in accordance with  the number of implemented requirements. The number of
functions remained virtually constant for the second certified version. This indicates that the
design remained relatively stable, most requirement changes could be accommodated in the
existing modules.
On average there are 5 functions per module. On average each file has been submitted to
configuration control 13 times. These changes are concentrated in one configuration item, the
second configuration item became stable after the version of day 536. The remaining 2
 configuration items remained unchanged after the version of day 438.
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These results support the view that also in an environment with significant requirement
evolution a sufficiently mature design is needed before  starting the coding process. The design
team leader ensured that the  design remained uncompromising during the entire realisation
period.
5.6 Code size evolution
The code size evolution is shown in figure 3. Its continuous increase until the first certified
version corresponds with the continuous  increase in the number of implemented requirements.
The subsequent slight reduction mirrors some requirements simplification.
Fig. 3 Code size evolution
The CASE tool used only allows to progress once from analysis to design and once from design
to code. It does not provide adequate support to incorporate analysis or design updates into the
next phases. The amount of effort needed for data input  even makes updating the analysis or
design model  cumbersome. After day 500 it was decided to retain the analysis model but limit
its depth in order to allow for its updating.
The design model was abandoned as the CASE tool data input effort became unaffordable with
the requirements evolution. Instead pseudo code was added to the code. The pseudo code
contains an abstract description of the code in about 27% of its size. Also all interface definition
information was added in extensive headers per function. This extra information explains  the
considerable increase in the amount of comment before the first certified version. The comment
has a size of about 175% of the executable  code.
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On average each line of executable code has been modified 13.4 times, each comment line only
4.1 times. Changing the design information from the CASE tool to comment resulted in
considerable  man-hour savings, at the expense of a transition period with a less intelligible
design. The design team leader and the verification  team leader had sufficient knowledge to
answer any question on the spot.  With a maximum team size of 16 people located on one site
this  turned out to be a workable solution. The changes break down in about 60% changed lines,
15% deleted lines and 25% added lines. As the product  grew in size over time more lines were
added then deleted.
5.7 Code breakdown
Fig. 4 Evolution of statement type distribution
For testing purposes a division of statements is made into :
 decisions and loops (consisting of the "switch", "if", "for" and "while" statements);
 assignments;
 data e.g. tables.
The results are shown in figure 4. All statement types increase  approximately continuously
until the first certified version, with a  slight decrease up till the second certified version. The
system design was already based on maximum configuration possibilities using data files.
Adapting the software behaviour to specific aircraft configurations by configuration files has the
advantage of  obviating re-certification. The real-time constraints caused some run-time
optimised solutions. Experience with the various prototypes lead to more sophisticated solutions
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which comply with both the real-time requirements as well as with the requirements evolution.
In the second certified version for each executable statement there is 1.48  lines of data. The
statement type distribution reflects the design based on maximum use of data for configuring
the software behaviour. The run-time optimisations are not reflected in a change of the
statement type distribution.
5.8 Verification
Each testable requirement is identified to allow traceability from requirements through all
development phases to verification. Every [DO-178B] compliant development phase contained
full traceability of each requirement,  by including the requirement identification. This has
greatly helped  the management of the virtually continuous requirement evolution. A  lesson
learned is to allocate a separate identification to each verifiable part of a requirement. [Hayh
1998] reached this conclusion  independently.
A standard applies for the software requirement process. Its application has to be verified. Some
simple tools can be produced to cost-effectively reduce the analysis effort. The same holds for
the design standard.
For module tests the use of a Commercial-Of-The-Shelf (COTS)  test tool greatly reduced the
time needed to prepare the tests and to perform the regressions tests for each delivery. The
actual test code is generated from Test Case  Definition (TCD) files. On average each safety-
critical function  (i.e. [DO-178B] level A+B) is called 3.8 times during the verification tests.
The non-comment part of the test case definition files equals 2.9 times the non-comment size of
the code. The test comment  grew to about 70% of the executable test case size implying that
tool-assisted module testing still consumes a significant mount of effort. Due to the size of the
test case definition files, comment is needed to document their function, to aid traceability, to
improve readability, etc.
[DO-178B] requires data to be verified by inspection, only decisions and  assignments can be
verified by testing. For each testable statement 20  checks have been performed. For global data
the test tool automatically checks that no global data is inadvertently changed, causing the large
amount of checks per testable statement.
Integration testing was based on the white box approach. It comprised  the correct functioning
of combinations of functions. Integration tests  also verified 19% of the requirements. These
requirements could not be  verified by black box testing only. Examples of the latter are
spare processor time and spare memory requirements. During integration 184 tests  have been
performed. The COTS test tool did not support the  multiple-module integration testing.
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During validation testing the requirements are verified using a black  box approach. Several
requirements can be verified in one test. The 132 tests verified 90% of the requirements.
Analysis was used to verify 12% of the requirements. Note that some  requirements can only be
verified by a combination of analysis, validation testing and integration testing. Consequently
the 3 percentages add  up to more then 100%.
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6 Conclusions
[DO-178B] compliant software processes have proven adequate for safety-critical software
development.
Measuring the requirements evolution (refer figure 1) combined with the co-development need
for intermediate versions resulted in the change from a waterfall software development process
to a spiral software development process.
For a certifiable, safety-critical product with a commercially determined  time-to-market co-
development is a solution. The various prototypes, with increasing number of implemented
requirements (refer figure 1), provided by a spiral software development process support this.
A sufficiently mature design is needed before starting the coding  process for the first prototype.
The design team leader has to ensure that the subsequent software modifications do not
compromise the design. The module evolution (refer figure 2) needs to be complemented by
other information to assess the design stability.
Metrics help in analysing and controlling the software processes. For example the evolution of
requirements with their implementation status (refer figure 1) and the module evolution (refer
figure 2), help in the trade-off between the date of the next delivery and its functions.
The CASE tool used did not adequately support design updates rendering it incompatible with
the spiral model. Detailed design and interfaces can be included as comment in the code, to be
automatically retrieved for the required documentation. The added source code (refer       figure
3) turned out to be acceptable.
The statement type distribution (refer figure 4) reflects the maximum use of data to configure
the software for each specific aircraft.
C combined with an appropriate coding standard and an automated analysis tool can be used for
safety-critical certifiable software.
For some analysis tasks simple tools can be produced which cost-effectively reduce the analysis
effort. The COTS test tool significantly reduced the  testing effort.
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